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Due Process, Equal Protection,
and the Unwed Father
Richard J. Matson

Introduction
Many cases have been tried by the United States
Supreme Court wherein the defendants believed that their
rights to due process and equal protection had been violated in
the original trial. These rights were established in Section I of
the Fourteenth Amendment:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws (emphasis
added).
The due process clause guarantees the right to a fair trial and
protects each citizen's basic rights1• According to the
Supreme Court, this includes the right of a parent to carry on
a relationship with their child (Quilloin 255). The equal
protection clause prohibits discrimination between persons
similarly situated under given conditions, usually based on
race or sex (Conley 367). But what is meant by "persons
'Bill of Rights, United States Constitution.
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similarly situated?" Are unwed fathers and divorced fathers
"similarly situated" when their child is up for adoption, and
should they be given the same rights? What about the rights
of the child?
Many of these questions were finally answered in
Quilloin v. Walcott 434 U.S., 54 L. Ed. 2d 511, 98 S.Ct. 549,
46 U.S.L.W. 4055 (1978) (Young 435). The Court ruled that
it is not a violation of the natural father's due process or equal
protection rights to deny him the right to object to the
adoption of his child by a stepfather, if, prior to the adoption
petition, he made no effort to legitimate or support the child.
According to the Court, the interests of the two father types
are readily distinguishable and therefore should not be treated
the same (Quilloin 255-256).
Stanley v. Illinois
The rights of an unwed father were first discussed in
Stanley v. Illinois. Peter Stanley was an unwed father who
lived with his illegitimate children and their mother for
eighteen years. After the mother died, the State of Illinois
decided that it would be in the childrens' "best interests" to
place them in adoptive homes. According to State statutes,
the children had no "surviving" parent2 (Davis 385-386).
"Stanley raised constitutional objections to this procedure,"
claiming that it violated his constitutional right to due process
and equal protection (Davis 386). The Court agreed with
Stanley and the decision was reversed.

Under the due process claim, the Court ruled it
unconstitutional for a state to presume parental unfitness
from the fact of illegitimacy. Under the equal protection claim
the Court made two rulings: (1) Unwed fathers are entitled to
the same hearing on parental fitness as a legitimate parent;
3
and (2) The state is required to give a de facto parent the same
procedural rights given to parents of legitimate children
(Davis 386-387). Unfortunately, the broad wording of the
decision left the exact extent of the requirements unclear. For
example: (1) What type of hearing is the unwed father entitled
to? (2) How much effort must a state exert to provide notice
to unwed fathers? (3) Are the unwed fathers now authorized
to veto an adoption? and (4) Are all unwed fathers entitled to
the same substantive parental rights as the parents of
legitimate children? (Davis 384). These unanswered questions
would be addressed in future cases.
Illegitimacy
Under Georgia Law, adoption of a child born in wedlock
requires the consent of each living parent who has not been
ruled unfit or surrendered rights to the child. In contrast,
adoption of an illegitimate child requires only the consent of
the mother (Ga. Code 74-4034). The unwed father must
An existing family relationship between the illegitimate child and
the unwed father (Davis 384).
3

4

2

According to Illinois Rev. Stat. Ch 37, 701-14 (1971), fitness of the
unwed father was irrelevant since he was not considered a "parent."

Section 74-403(1) (1973) states:
No adoption shall be permitted except with the written consent of the
living parents of the child.
Section 74-403(2) (1973) states:
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either marry the mother or obtain a court order declaring the
child legitimate if he is to gain the same veto power possessed
by other parents (Ga. Code 74-103l Unless this occurs, the
mother possesses exclusive authority over all legal matters

Consent [to adoption] of a parent shall not be required where a child
has been abandoned by such parent, or where such parent of a child ·
cannot be found after a diligent search has been made, or where such
parent is insane or otherwise incapacitated from giving such consent and
the court is of the opinion that the adoption is for the best interests of the
child .... Where a decree has been entered by a superior court of this
State or any other court of competent jurisdiction of any other State
ordering a parent to support a child and such a parent has wantonly and
wilfully failed to comply with the order for a period of 12 months or
longer, the consent of such parent shall not be required and the consent of
the other parent alone shall suffice in any proceedings for adoption
relative to such child.
Section 74-403(3) (1973) states:
Illegitimate children.-If the child be illegitimate, the consent of the
mother alone shall suffice. Such consent, however, shall not be required if
the mother has surrendered all of her rights to said child to a licensed
child-placing agency, or to the State Department of Family and Children
Services.
5

A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate by
petitioning the superior court of the county of his residence, setting forth
the name, age, sex of the child, and also the name of the mother; and if he
desires the name changed, stating the new name, and praying the
legitimation of such child. Of this application the mother, if alive, shall
have notice. Upon such application, presented and filed, the court may
pass an order declaring said child legitimate, and capable of inheriting
from the father in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock, and the
name by which he or she shall be known.

which concern the child and is the only recognized parent
6
(Ga. Code 74-203 ).
In accordance with Stanley v. Illinois, Georgia is required
to notify the unwed father of legal actions which concern his
relationship to the child. The state is also required to refrain
from automatically presuming the father unfit because the
child is illegitimate. The father must be given the opportunity
to prove he is a de facto parent and therefore entitled to the
same procedural protections given to parents of legitimate
children (Davis 394).
Georgia also employed the "rational basis" standard,
which was a broad interpretation of Stanley. In essence, "the
Georgia Court was rejecting the contention that Stanley had
designated an unwed father's parental interests as
'fundamental,' the infringement of which could only be
sustained by a 'compelling state interest"'(Davis 390).

History of the Case
Darrell Williams, the illegitimate child of Ardell
Williams Walcott (mother) and Leon Webster Quilloin
(father), was born in December 1964. His natural parents
never married, nor did they ever live together. When his
mother married Randall Walcott in September 1967, he went
to live with his maternal grandmother for two years. Except
for those two years, Darrell always lived in the custody of his

"The mother of an illegitimate child shall be entitled to the
possession of the child, unless the father shall legitimate him as before
provided. Being the only recognized parent, she may exercise all the
paternal [parental] power."
6
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mother. During his early childhood, Darrell's natural father
made no effort to legitimate or obtain custody of him, and he
was never a de facto member of the family (H.C.T.R. 805).
On March 24, 1976, after obtaining his wife's consent,
Randall Walcott filed a petition to adopt Darrell. In
accordance with Stanley, the Georgia Department of Human
Resources notified the natural father about the petition for
adoption. Quilloin did not wish to lose contact with his son,
so he immediately tried to block the adoption. He applied for
a writ of habeus corpus seeking visitation rights, a petition for
legitimation, and an objection to the adoption (Davis 389).
Georgia Trial Court
Quilloin's petitions were consolidated for trial, pending a
Georgia trial court's decision on finding him (or not) a fit
parent. The court found that, although Leon never
abandoned the child, he provided financial and physical
support only on an irregular basis. He also did not desire
custody of the child. On the other hand, Walcott was
considered a "fit and proper person" for the proposed
adoption. The court also took into account Darrell's
expressed desire to be adopted by his stepfather and the
mother's testimony that Quilloin's sporadic visits had a
disruptive effect on both the child and her family (H.C.T.R.
806-807).
Although the court did not find Quilloin to be an unfit
parent, his petition for legitimation and visitation rights was
denied on the grounds that it was not in the "best interests of
the child." Since he had not legitimated the child in the
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eleven years prior to the petition, Quilloin lacked standing to
object to the adoption and Walcott prevailed (H.C.T.R. 806).
Georgia Supreme Court
Quilloin appealed to the Georgia State Supreme Court,
claiming that Georgia Codes74-203 and 74-403, as applied in
his case, violated his right to due process and equal protection.
He argued that due to Stanley, he was entitled to the same
veto power over adoption that is given to a divorced or
married father and to unwed mothers. Quilloin felt that since
the trial court did not find him an unfit parent or guilty of
abandonment, adoption should not have been allowed.
The court affirmed the judgement (Young 438). The
decision was based on a strong state policy that children
should be reared in a family setting. Furthermore, "the court
feared that this policy might be hindered if it were necessary
for unwed fathers to consent to adoptions" (H.C.T.R. 807).
Since in this case adoption was sought by the stepfather,
adoption solidified an existing family unit and thus provided
7

The court stated:

If the mother of an illegitimate child decides not to raise the child
herself and consents to adoption, the state's interest in promoting the
family as an institution for child rearing is served since the child will be
placed with the adopting family. If the consent of the natural father were
also required he might refuse without accepting the responsibility of
fatherhood, and the state could be required to sever his relationship before
the adoption could proceed. In addition, since the father has already
shown his lack of interest by his failure to legitimate the child, there
would be a very real danger of profit seeking by the father in order to
secure his consent to the adoption (Butler v. Butler, 238 Ga.198, 232
S.E.2d 246, 248 (1977) .
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the youth with the best environment for growth (H.C.T.R.
807-808).

Arguments
Quilloin next appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on
the grounds that he was entitled to an absolute veto over the
adoption of his son unless the Court ruled that he was an
unfit parent. He based his appeal on the assumption that the
natural father should receive the same privileges granted to a
divorced father (Stanley). By denying him these same
privileges, the state violated his right to equal protection. He
also claimed that his right to due process was violated when the
state applied the "best interests of the child" standard to his
case (Quilloin 254-255).
Before the Court, The State of Georgia responded by
claiming that Quilloin's right to due process was not violated
since any constitutionally protected interest he had was lost
after he failed to legitimate his son during the eleven years
prior to the adoption hearing (Quilloin 254). Georgia further
argued that Stanley was not a controlling factor in this case
since the cases were not similar. In Stanley, "the father was a
de facto member of the family unit, and the mother had died.
Either of these factual differences would be sufficient to
distinguish Stanley from the case before us"(H.C.T.R. 808).
Since Quilloin was not a de facto parent, his right to equal
protection was not violated when he was denied an absolute
veto over the adoption of his son by Walcott.
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Quilloin v. Walcott
On January 10, 1978, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court (Conley
363). Justice Marshall began by recognizing that the
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected (Quilloin 255). The Court conceded that the
appellant's due process rights would be violated "if a state
forced the breakup of a natural family unit, over the
objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interests"8 (Quilloin 255).
That was not the circumstance in this case; the unwed father
did not seek custody of the child, nor would adoption place
the child in a new family setting. On the contrary, adoption
would give full recognition to a family unit already in
existence. According to Justice Marshall, "Georgia was
recognizing a family, not destroying one" (Davis 390). In
such a case, the state is not required to find more than in the
"best interests of the child" (H.C.T.R. 809). The Supreme
Court also decided against Quilloin's claim that his right to
equal protection had been violated. They ruled that the
appellant's interests were clearly distinguishable from those of
a married or divorced father. Quilloin never exercised
custody nor shouldered any of the responsibility for rearing
Darrell. He was therefore not entitled to equal privileges
(H.C.T.R. 810). "Georgia statute's distinction between wed
and unwed fathers survived the scrutiny of the Court through
8

Smith v. Organization ofFoster Families, 431 U.S. 632, 862-863

(1977)
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a finding that ... the classifications were not of persons
similarly situated" (Conley 368). Wed fathers provide more
for the financial and educational welfare of the child and
consequently have more vested interests in the child. Such
recognition does not deny equal protection of the law
(H.C.T.R. 810).
Results
Qui/loin v. Walcott established that the "child's best
interests" standard is the most important factor in
determining child custody. The standard allows a court to
consider moral fitness, the home environment, the child's
emotional ties to the parties, the party's emotional ties to the
child, the age, sex, or health of the child, the desirability of
continuing an existing relationship, and the child's preference
in making this decision (Davis 389). The Court also
established that only de facto parents must be afforded full
parental rights. In doing so, judicial recognition was given to
the concept that "there can be no absolute parental right
without parental responsibility"9 (Conley 369).
Conclusion
This ruling was both fair and just. Leon Quilloin had
eleven years prior to the petition for adoption to either
legitimate Darrell or play a more active role in his son's life.

He chose to do neither. Quilloin was not a de facto parent
and only rarely provided any financial or physical support for
his son. As the Court stated, "there can be no absolute
parental right without parental responsibility" (Conley 369).
Furthermore, his sporadic visits tended to have a disruptive
effect on the child. It was therefore not in the "child's best
interests" to allow Quilloin to veto the adoption, especially
since he did not seek custody of the child-he only wished to
prevent solidification of the existing family unit. It is my
opinion that the Supreme Court acted wisely; neither
Quilloin's right to due process nor equal protection were
violated in the original trial.
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Palmore v. Sidoti
Collette Harrell

Issue

Does the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause preclude consideration of a stepparent involved in
miscegenation when determining custody awards? To what
extent can similar standards be applied to interracial adoption
issues?
Facts

Linda and Anthony Sidoti, two Caucasians, divorced in
Florida in May of 1980. Linda was awarded custody of their
three year-old daughter, Melanie. In September 1981,
Anthony challenged the custody award, asserting that an
"extreme change" in the child's living conditions warranted
awarding him custody. The "extreme change" referred to
Linda cohabiting with an African-American, Clarence
Palmore, Jr. 1
1
Palmore was Linda's fiance and they subsequently married in November
1981. Anthony also accused Linda of failing to provide adequate care for the
daughter's hygiene, namely that his daughter had contracted head lice and worn
a mildew-stained article of clothing to school. However, the claim of hygiene
neglect was never substantiated and never addressed by the court. The only
question remaining for consideration by the Supreme Court was whether the
mother's interracial marriage should affect her right to custody of her daughter.

